mishap, claimed that he had obtained new evidence that could prove his innocence. In light of this, the Israeli government decided to establish yet another committee composed of seven Ministers ("The Committee of Seven"). The Minster of Justice, Pinchas Rosen, was chairman, but Levi Eshkol was the dominant Wgure. This committee concluded that Lavon was innocent of approving the operation.
Ben-Gurion rejected the verdict, arguing that only a judicial committee could decide the matter. The majority in Labor, the party Ben-Gurion had lead for decades, refused to uphold his position and denied his demand for further inquiry into the scandal. They seemed to be eager to relegate the whole aVair to the dustbin of history. When Eshkol became Prime Minister, he calculated that continued public preoccupation with the aVair could endanger his government's stability. Consequently, he adamantly refused to yield to Ben-Gurion's call for a renewed investigation. By 1965, Ben-Gurion felt he could no longer remain in the same party with Eshkol and left to establish RaW. The bitter and raucous feud with Eshkol resonates throughout the Diary and is here played out under the threat of a catastrophic conXict.
During the tense period before the war, Ben-Gurion charged that the crisis was to a large extent due to Eshkol's muddled policies and mismanagement of state aVairs. Ben-Gurion and his supporters in RaW openly criticized Eshkol, claiming that he should have known that an aggressive policy toward Syria would culminate in warfare. He also accused Eshkol for a dangerous deterioration in Israel's relations with France, Israel's main ally and arms supplier. In the same vein, he admonished Eshkol for allowing the Israeli Intelligence Agency (the Mossad) to assist Moroccan undercover agents to assassinate a well-known Moroccan opposition leader, Mohammed Ben-Barka, on French soil. This reckless decision, asserted Ben-Gurion, could lead to a breakdown in French-Israeli relations. Echoing a longstanding concern, Ben-Gurion worried that, in the event of an all-out war with the Arab world, Israel might Wnd herself short of arms and munitions if the French were further alienated.
2
As the crisis with Egypt escalated and war appeared on the horizon, public pressure was exerted on Eshkol to relinquish his position as Defense Minister. The most popular candidate for this post was Moshe Dayan, a former Chief-of-StaV and Ben-Gurion's trusted associate. Ben-Gurion was not placated by this suggestion. He wanted Eshkol also removed as Prime Minister. For the public record, Ben-Gurion stated that he, himself, was not interested in replacing Eshkol as Prime Minister. There is strong intimation here, however, that Ben-Gurion hoped this would, in fact, happen.
When party leaders began negotiations on the creation of a national unity government to face the escalating crisis, Ben-Gurion agreed to an arrangement whereby he would serve as Israel's Prime Minister with Eshkol as Deputy Prime Minister. In this scenario, Ben-Gurion found an unexpected ally in Menachem Begin, who had been one of his bitterest opponents during the previous twenty years. Begin, the leader of the right-wing Gahal, presented this "compromise" solution to Eshkol, who categorically rejected it declaring: "These two horses [himself and Ben-Gurion] cannot be hitched to the same carriage." With the sinking of this trial-balloon, another idea was launched: the nomination of Moshe Dayan as Defense Minister with Eshkol remaining as Prime Minister. According to this scenario, Ben-Gurion would have no oYcial role in government. 3 When he came to realize that he lacked a majority to oust Eshkol and become Prime Minister, he gave tacit approval to the arrangement. As a gesture of good will, Dayan vowed that he would consult Ben-Gurion on every important decision. Yet, Ben-Gurion soon realized that it was totally impractical for a Defense Minister, up to his neck in a full-Xedged war, to keep such a promise.
As the threat of war grew imminent following Egypt's massive troop concentration in the Sinai in mid-May 1967, Ben-Gurion urged that military operations against Egypt be undertaken only upon consultation with the Great Powers, particularly the United States. He predicted that the war could be prolonged and exact a high price in casualties. Ben-Gurion was also convinced that Israel would need to be rearmed during the conXict, and that the Western Powers would supply Israel with vital weapons only if they had been consulted prior to the attack on Egypt. His apprehensions are indicative of the widespread anxiety that seized the country during this period.
Ben-Gurion at the Western Wall with Col. Chaim Herzog, 1 July 1967.
Courtesy of the Government Press OYce
Ben-Gurion was clearly surprised by the quick and decisive victory achieved by the Israeli army and air force. On 5 June 1967, Ben-Gurion was invited to the General StaV's "situation room" for a brieWng, where he learned about the Israeli Air Force's brilliant strike against Egyptian planes and airWelds. His response was enthusiastic. He had no doubt that the nation would soon be engulfed in an outburst of euphoria and excitement. 4 During the course of the war, he opposed attacking Syria. Although he believed that Syria was certainly deserving of severe punishment, he was alarmed that the Soviet Union might intervene on the side of its closest Middle-Eastern ally. Ben-Gurion had long stressed that Israel should never embark upon actions that might entangle it in a violent conXict with a Great Power such as the Soviet Union.
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While the war was being waged, as well as after it, Ben-Gurion's attention was focused primarily on Jerusalem. He was manifestly obsessed with the need to guarantee that the Old City of Jerusalem, occupied by Israeli forces on the second day of the war, would quickly become populated by as many Jews as possible in order to solidify and conWrm Israeli control.
6 He warned that the city would not remain in Jewish hands unless the government initiated energetic programs of directed settlement and construction. For Ben-Gurion, this new situation oVered an opportunity for rectifying one of the failures of Israel's War of Independence, which had resulted in a divided city, with Israel excluded from the historic core in the eastern sector.
Over the past thirty years, Ben-Gurion's perspective and proposals have become part of the Israeli consensus. Certainly his insistence on maintaining Jewish control over the city is a principle shared by most of the country's leadership and population. So, too, has his willingness to negotiate the withdrawal from other gains on the battleWeld for the sake of a lasting accommodation with Israel's neighbors. Finally, there is also widespread appreciation for his view that Israel should not attempt to govern the Arab population on the West Bank. In sum, in these entries one can perceive the initial attempt to grapple with issues that have been central in Israeli society since the Six-Day War. the crisis: It will be an unprecedented test of our strength, our task is to open the straits, but we'll act only after receiving guarantees from friendly countries. Opening the straits by force would lead to war. Without the Western world's approval, the supply of weapons would dwindle. The Egyptian army (perhaps all the Arab armies will be aligned against us) are stronger now than ever. We will suVer losses in human life and arms, so will the Egyptians. Loss of life is not among their worries, and arms they'll receive from Russia as much as they ask for. Without the certainty that we'll be re-armed by America, England, France, or all of them-we will fail. It would be the end, and we'd have to face reality. Our army is excellent, but this time we can't count on a David and Goliath style war. About a hundred women were demonstrating. They carried two placards: "Golda-Enough Hatred!" "Eshkol-Let BG Take Over" . . . -We held a RaW party meeting this evening but many other people showed up. In the meantime we heard on the "Voice of Israel" Apparently the Jordanian Arab Legion is still the best Wghting force of all the Arab armies. -Nasser has invented a new Wction. On Sunday it was reported that Egyptian aerial bombing ignited Tel-Aviv. But the bitter news seems to have reached the Egyptians, and yesterday they fabricated a new line: English and American pilots are attacking the Arabs. -At ten-thirty Yosef Sapir came to see me. He said that he's heard that we've already entered the Old City, and that America is not opposed to our destruction of Nasser's army and his allies' forces. He asks what we should do with the Old City and West Bank? -I told him we should carry out the victory to its conclusion. It's impossible to forget that there are one million Arabs in the West Bank, any addition to the Arab population in Israel is unnecessary. There are also nearly two hundred thousand refugees in the Gaza Strip and it won't be easy to move them. But these problems will be dealt with after our victory on all the fronts. We still must deliver a fatal blow to the Syrians for what they did to our farming settlements yesterday, albeit under pressure from Nasser. Russia has backed down from its demand that all sides (that is, Israeli forces) withdraw to their positions before hostilities began, it's preferable to refer the matter to the UN Security Council and not the General Assembly (although there won't be a repeat performance of 1956). World support of Israel will increase when our spectacular victory is made fully known. -Sapir asked if he could turn to me for advice whenever he needs to. I agreed. -At a quarter to twelve Haim informed me that Nablus was in our hands.
Our Gaulle, and asked me if I wanted to come with him to Paris. I answered him the same way I did to Edmond. According to Closterman, De Gaulle wants to make peace. I told him that if the Arabs agree to make peace, my opinion, as a private citizen, is that we should withdraw from the territories we've captured, except the Old City. But we would not withdraw from anywhere unless there is peace. -They have to return to France this evening. We parted the best of friends.
-I invited [Moshe] Shapira and Begin to come and see me. I told them that it's not certain if the war will be over tomorrow. At any rate, the international struggle will begin immediately over four issues: the Old City, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Sinai. On Jerusalem we must not budge. We have to quickly establish a large Jewish settlement there. Moshe and asked why we are not smashing the Syrians? He replied that they're Wghting bravely, and we have concentrated a huge force of aircraft, armor, artillery, etc. to confront them. Two of our planes were downed, a Super-Mystere and a Fouga. I asked how the cease-Wre was broken. Who did it? He preferred not to reply, but even this is answer enough . . . -A few minutes ago, the "Voice of Israel" broadcast that Nasser has resigned after assuming responsibility for his army's defeat. Zakaria Mohieddin [Deputy President of the U.A.R.] has acceded in his place. I believe this is a clever trick on Nasser's part. He will certainly return to power. -At eight-thirty in the evening, Zur came to see me. Moshe has launched the battle for the Golan Heights. The Syrians reported a cease-Wre at fourthirty in the morning, following Nasser's plea, [but] in yesterday's government meeting the cabinet voted on taking the Heights from Syria. Moshe was opposed, but changed his opinion in the morning. -171,000 reservists have been called up; the number of dead has risen to leave 30,000. In the standing army there are about 56-60,000 men. Zur believes that if they put pressure on Moshe, he'll resign. He needs our support.
-It was a big mistake to break the cease-Wre with Syria. We have no need of the Golan Heights, because we won't be staying there; the major error has been to unnecessarily violate the Security Council's ruling. We'll soon be facing issues more vital, and we don't need our enemies knowing that we broke our word. We agreed on a cease-Wre yet continued Wghting. This was especially unnecessary for us and can injure both our good name and the northern settlements. -A German phoned me, and asked my opinion on Nasser's resignation.
I'm convinced that it was one of the cleverest moves he's ever made. It will return him to government and raise his stature in Egypt. Voting in favor (excluding myself): Fishman, Gruenbaum, Zisling, and Bentov. Against: Rosenblueth, Shapira, Levin, Bernstein, Kaplan, Remez, and Sharett (seven against Wve). In response to this I said, "There will be tears over this for generations." In the Six-Day War, the IDF put an end to the 'generations' . . .
